Mobile Device and Wireless Network Security

The security of existing wireless networks

Cellular networks:

- GSM;
- UMTS;

WiFi LANs;

Bluetooth

Di Ma

Today's Outline

1 Cellular networks

2 WiFi LANs

3 Bluetooth

Introduction to Cellular Networks

cell
- covers geographical region
- *base station* (BS) analogous to 802.11 AP
- *mobile users* attach to network through BS
- *air-interface:* physical and link layer protocol between mobile and BS

MSC
- connects cells to wide area net
- manages call setup
- handles mobility



Cellular Network Features and Trust Assumptions

- Features
  - Wide coverage
  - Large number of users
  - High deployment costs: wired communication between base stations

- Trust Assumption
  - The operator is somewhat trusted
    - Big companies who care about reputation and brand name

GSM Security

- main security requirement
  - subscriber authentication (for the sake of billing)
    - challenge-response protocol
    - long-term secret key shared between the subscriber and the home network operator
    - supports roaming without revealing long-term key to the visited networks
- other security services provided by GSM
  - confidentiality of communications and signaling over the wireless interface
    - encryption key shared between the subscriber and the visited network is established with the help of the home network as part of the subscriber authentication protocol
  - protection of the subscriber's identity from eavesdroppers on the wireless interface
    - usage of short-term temporary identifiers

The SIM card (Subscriber Identity Module)

- Contains all data specific to the end user which have to reside in the Mobile Station:
  - IMSI: International Mobile Subscriber Identity (permanent user's identity)
  - PIN
  - TMSI (Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity)
  - K_i : User's secret key shared with home network
  - K_c : Ciphering key to encrypt communication data
  - List of the last call attempts
  - List of preferred operators
  - Supplementary service data (abbreviated dialing, last short messages received,...)
- Must be tamper-resistant
- Protected by a PIN code (checked locally by the SIM)
- Is removable from the terminal

Authentication principle of GSM



S: correct response to challenge R

A3, A8: defined by GSM specification

Cryptographic algorithms of GSM



K_c: ciphering key
S : signed result
A3: subscriber authentication (operator-dependent algorithm)
A5: ciphering/deciphering (standardized algorithm)
A8: cipher generation (operator-dependent algorithm)

Ciphering in GSM



Protection of Subscriber's Identity

- After successful authentication, the visited network generate a temporary mobile subscriber identifier – TMSI
- Encrypt TMSI with the newly established ciphering key
- Send the encrypted TMSI to the mobile phone
- TMSI is used to identify a mobile phone in subsequent authentication

GSM security provides …

- Subscriber authentication
  - Allow visited network to authenticate the subscriber without possessing the subscriber's long-term secret key
  - With help from home network operator
  - Assumption: trust in the home network operator by the visited network operator
- Confidentiality of communications on the wireless link
- Protection of the subscriber's identity from eavesdroppers on the wireless link

But …

- Focused on the protection of the air interface
- No protection on the wired part of the network (neither for privacy nor for confidentiality)
- The visited network has access to all data (except the secret key of the end user)
- Generally robust, but a few successful attacks have been reported:
  - faked base stations
    - Suppose the fake station knew an old triplet and the corresponding session key
    - The mobile phone cannot distinguish it's an old challenge. It will generate session key based on the challenge and use it for communication.
  - Weakness in A3 and A8 → allowing compromise of the long-term key and clone the same card

Provide a reasonable security level but have deficiencies. Hence the design of new security architecture in the 3rd generation cellular networks.

3GPP Security Principles (1/2)

- Reuse of 2nd generation security principles (GSM):
  - Removable hardware security module
    - In GSM: SIM card
    - In 3GPP: USIM (User Services Identity Module)
  - Radio interface encryption
  - Limited trust in the Visited Network
  - Protection of the identity of the end user (especially on the radio interface)

- Correction of the following weaknesses of the previous generation:
  - Possible attacks from a faked base station
  - Cipher keys and authentication data transmitted in clear between and within networks
  - Encryption not used in some networks ➔ open to fraud
  - Data integrity not provided
  - …

3GPP Security Principles (2/2)

- New security features
  - New kind of service providers (content providers, HLR only service providers,…)
  - Increased control for the user over their service profile
  - Enhanced resistance to active attacks
  - Increased importance of non-voice services
  - …

Authentication in UMTS



Generation of the authentication vectors



$$AUTN := (SQN \oplus AK) \,\|\, AMF \,\|\, MAC$$
$$AV := RAND \,\|\, XRES \,\|\, CK \,\|\, IK \,\|\, AUTN$$

AMF: Authentication and Key Management Field
AUTN: Authentication Token
AV: Authentication Vector

User Authentication Function in the USIM



- Verify MAC = XMAC
- Verify that SQN is in the correct range

USIM: User Services Identity Module

More about the authentication and key generation

- f1, f2, f3, f4, and f5 are operator-specific
- However, 3GPP provides a detailed example of algorithm set, called *MILENAGE*
- MILENAGE is based on the *Rijndael* block cipher (AES)
- In MILENAGE, the generation of all seven functions f1…f5 are based on the Rijndael algorithm

Signalling integrity protection method



Sender
(Mobile Station or
Radio Network Controller)



Receiver
(Radio Network Controller
or Mobile Station)

FRESH: random input

Ciphering method



BEARER: radio bearer identifier
COUNT-C: ciphering sequence counter

Conclusion on 3GPP security

- Some improvement with respect to 2nd generation
  - Cryptographic algorithms are published
  - Integrity of the signalling messages is protected
- Privacy/anonymity of the user not completely protected
- 2nd/3rd generation interoperation will be complicated and might open security breaches

Chapter outline

Introduction to WiFi



Introduction to WiFi



WEP – Wired Equivalent Privacy

- part of the IEEE 802.11 wireless LAN standard

- goal
  - make the WiFi network *at least as secure as a wired LAN* (that has no particular protection mechanisms)
  - WEP was never intended to achieve strong security

- services
  - access control to the network
  - message confidentiality
  - message integrity

WEP – Access control

- before association, the STA needs to authenticate itself to the AP

- authentication is based on a simple challenge-response protocol:

  STA → AP: authenticate request

  AP → STA: authenticate challenge (r) // r is 128 bits long

  STA → AP: authenticate response ($e_K(r)$)

  AP → STA: authenticate success/failure

- once authenticated, the STA can send an association request, and the AP will respond with an association response
- if authentication fails, no association is possible

WEP – Message confidentiality and integrity

- WEP encryption is based on RC4 (a stream cipher developed in 1987 by Ron Rivest for RSA Data Security, Inc.)
  - operation:
    - for each message to be sent:
      - RC4 is initialized with the shared secret (between STA and AP)
      - RC4 produces a pseudo-random byte sequence (key stream)
      - this pseudo-random byte sequence is XORed to the message
    - reception is analogous
  - it is essential that each message is encrypted with a different key stream
    - the RC4 generator is initialized with the shared secret and an IV (initial value) together
      - shared secret is the same for each message
      - 24-bit IV changes for every message

- WEP integrity protection is based on an encrypted CRC value
  - operation:
    - ICV (integrity check value) is computed and appended to the message
    - the message and the ICV are encrypted together

WEP – Message confidentiality and integrity



K: pseudo-random sequence

WEP – Keys

- two kinds of keys are allowed by the standard
  - default key (also called shared key, group key, multicast key, broadcast key, key)
  - key mapping keys (also called individual key, per-station key, unique key)



- in practice, often only default keys are supported
  - the default key is manually installed in every STA and the AP
  - each STA uses the same shared secret key → in principle, STAs can decrypt each other's messages

WEP – Management of default keys

- the default key is a group key, and group keys need to be changed when a member leaves the group
  - e.g., when someone leaves the company and shouldn't have access to the network anymore
- it is practically impossible to change the default key in every device simultaneously
- hence, WEP supports multiple default keys to help the smooth change of keys
  - one of the keys is called the active key
  - the active key is used to encrypt messages
  - any key can be used to decrypt messages
  - the message header contains a key ID that allows the receiver to find out which key should be used to decrypt the message

WEP – The key change process



WEP flaws – Authentication and access control

- authentication is one-way only
  - AP is not authenticated to STA
  - STA is at risk to associate to a rogue AP
- the same shared secret key is used for authentication and encryption
  - weaknesses in any of the two protocols can be used to break the key
- no session key is established during authentication
  - access control is not continuous
  - once a STA has authenticated and associated to the AP, an attacker send messages using the MAC address of STA
  - correctly encrypted messages cannot be produced by the attacker, but replay of STA messages is still possible
- STA can be impersonated
  - … next slide

WEP flaws – Authentication and access control

- recall that authentication is based on a challenge-response protocol:

  …

  AP → STA: r

  STA → AP: IV | r $\oplus$ K

  …

  where K is a 128 bit RC4 output on IV and the shared secret

- an attacker can compute r $\oplus$ (r $\oplus$ K) = K

- then it can use K to impersonate STA later:

  …

  AP → attacker: r'

  attacker → AP: IV | r' $\oplus$ K

  …

WEP flaws – Integrity and replay protection

- There's no replay protection at all
  - IV is not mandated to be incremented after each message

- The attacker can manipulate messages despite the ICV mechanism and encryption
  - CRC is a linear function wrt to XOR:

$$CRC(X \oplus Y) = CRC(X) \oplus CRC(Y)$$

  - attacker observes $(M \mid CRC(M)) \oplus K$ where K is the RC4 output
  - suppose attacker wants to make a change ΔM on message M
  - attacker needs and can compute $CRC(\Delta M)$
  - hence, the attacker can compute:

Original encrypted message → $((M \mid CRC(M)) \oplus K)$

$$((M \mid CRC(M)) \oplus K) \oplus (\Delta M \mid CRC(\Delta M)) =$$
$$((M \oplus \Delta M) \mid (CRC(M) \oplus CRC(\Delta M))) \oplus K =$$
$$((M \oplus \Delta M) \mid CRC(M \oplus \Delta M)) \oplus K$$

Faked encrypted message → $((M \oplus \Delta M) \mid CRC(M \oplus \Delta M)) \oplus K$

WEP flaws – Confidentiality

- IV reuse
  - IV space is too small
    - IV size is only 24 bits → there are 16,777,216 possible IVs
    - after around 17 million messages, IVs are reused
    - a busy AP at 11 Mbps is capable for transmitting 700 packets per second → IV space is used up in around 7 hours
  - in many implementations IVs are initialized with 0 on startup
    - if several devices are switched on nearly at the same time, they all use the same sequence of IVs
    - if they all use the same default key (which is the common case), then IV collisions are readily available to an attacker

- weak RC4 keys
  - for some seed values (called weak keys), the beginning of the RC4 output is not really random
  - if a weak key is used, then the first few bytes of the output reveals a lot of information about the key → breaking the key is made easier
  - for this reason, crypto experts suggest to always throw away the first 256 bytes of the RC4 output, but WEP doesn't do that
  - due to the use of IVs, eventually a weak key will be used, and the attacker will know that, because the IV is sent in clear

  → WEP encryption can be broken by capturing a few million messages !!!

WEP – Lessons learnt

1. Engineering security protocols is difficult
   - One can combine otherwise strong building blocks in a wrong way and obtain an insecure system at the end
     - Example 1:
       - stream ciphers alone are OK
       - challenge-response protocols for entity authentication are OK
       - but they shouldn't be combined
     - Example 2:
       - encrypting a message digest to obtain an ICV is a good principle
       - but it doesn't work if the message digest function is linear wrt to the encryption function
   - Don't do it alone (unless you are a security expert)
     - functional properties can be tested, but security is a non-functional property → it is extremely difficult to tell if a system is secure or not
   - Using an expert in the design phase pays out (fixing the system after deployment will be much more expensive)
     - experts will not guarantee that your system is 100% secure
     - but at least they know many pitfalls
     - they know the details of crypto algorithms

2. Avoid the use of WEP (as much as possible)

Overview of 802.11i

- After the collapse of WEP, IEEE started to develop a new security architecture → 802.11i

- Main novelties in 802.11i wrt to WEP
  - access control model is based on 802.1X
  - flexible authentication framework (based on EAP – Extensible Authentication Protocol)
  - authentication can be based on strong protocols (e.g., TLS – Transport Layer Security)
  - authentication process results in a shared session key (which prevents session hijacking)
  - different functions (encryption, integrity) use different keys derived from the session key using a one-way function
  - integrity protection is improved
  - encryption function is improved

Overview of 802.11i

- 802.11i defines the concept of RSN (Robust Security Network)
  - integrity protection and encryption is based on AES (and not on RC4 anymore)
  - nice solution, but needs new hardware → cannot be adopted immediately
- 802.11i also defines an optional protocol called TKIP (Temporal Key Integrity Protocol)
  - integrity protection is based on Michael (we will skip the details of that)
  - encryption is based on RC4, but WEP's problems have been avoided
  - ugly solution, but runs on old hardware (after software upgrade)
- Industrial names
  - TKIP → WPA (WiFi Protected Access)
  - RSN/AES → WPA2

802.1X authentication model



- the <u>supplicant</u> **requests** access to the services (wants to connect to the network)
- the <u>authenticator</u> **controls** access to the services (controls the state of a port)
- the <u>authentication server</u> **authorizes** access to the services
  - the supplicant authenticates itself to the authentication server
  - if the authentication is successful, the authentication server instructs the authenticator to switch the port on
  - the authentication server informs the supplicant that access is allowed

Mapping the 802.1X model to WiFi

- supplicant → mobile device (STA)
- authenticator → access point (AP)
- authentication server → server application running on the AP or on a dedicated machine
- port → logical state implemented in software in the AP

- one more thing is added to the basic 802.1X model in 802.11i:
  - successful authentication results not only in switching the port on, but also in a session key between the mobile device and the authentication server
  - the session key is sent to the AP in a secure way
    - this assumes a shared key between the AP and the auth server
    - this key is usually set up manually

Protocols – EAP, EAPOL, and RADIUS

- EAP (Extensible Authentication Protocol) [RFC 3748]
  - carrier protocol designed to transport the messages of "real" authentication protocols (e.g., TLS)
  - very simple, four types of messages:
    - EAP request – carries messages from the supplicant to the authentication server
    - EAP response – carries messages from the authentication server to the supplicant
    - EAP success – signals successful authentication
    - EAP failure – signals authentication failure
  - authenticator doesn't understand what is inside the EAP messages, it recognizes only EAP success and failure

- EAPOL (EAP over LAN) [802.1X]
  - used to encapsulate EAP messages into LAN protocols (e.g., Ethernet)
  - EAPOL is used to carry EAP messages between the STA and the AP

- RADIUS (Remote Access Dial-In User Service) [RFC 2865-2869, RFC 2548]
  - used to carry EAP messages between the AP and the auth server
  - MS-MPPE-Recv-Key attribute is used to transport the session key from the auth server to the AP
  - RADIUS is mandated by WPA and optional for RSN

Key hierarchies



Four-way handshake

- objective:
  - exchange random values to be used in the generation of PTK
  - prove both parties know the PMK (result of authentication)

- protocol:

AP : generate ANonce
AP → STA : ANonce | KeyReplayCtr
STA : generate SNonce and compute PTK
STA → AP : SNonce | KeyReplayCtr | MIC_{KIK}
AP : compute PTK, generate GTK, and verify MIC
AP → STA : ANonce | KeyReplayCtr+1 | $\{GTK\}_{KEK}$ | MIC_{KIK}
STA : verify MIC and install keys
STA → AP : KeyReplayCtr+1 | MIC_{KIK}
AP : verify MIC and install keys

MIC_{KIK} : Message Integrity Code (computed by the mobile device using the key-integrity key)
KeyReplayCtr: used to prevent replay attacks

TKIP and AES-CCMP

- Both TKIP (used in WPA) and AES-CCMP (used in RSN or WPA2) are based on the same key hierarchy

- However, they use different cryptographic algorithms
  - TKIP
    - uses RC4
    - corrects WEP's flaws
    - can run on old WEP hardware
  - AES-CCMP
    - uses AES
    - needs new hardware to support AES

PTK and GTK computation

- for TKIP

PRF-512(PMK,
"Pairwise key expansion",
MAC1 | MAC2 | Nonce1 | Nonce2) =
= KEK | KIK | DEK | DIK

PRF-256(GMK,
"Group key expansion",
MAC | GNonce) =
= GEK | GIK

- for AES-CCMP

PRF-384(PMK,
"Pairwise key expansion",
MAC1 | MAC2 | Nonce1 | Nonce2) =
= KEK | KIK | DE&IK

PRF-128(GMK,
"Group key expansion",
MAC | GNonce) =
= GE&IK

Summary on WiFi security

- security has always been considered important for WiFi
- early solution was based on WEP
  - seriously flawed
  - not recommended to use
- the new security standard for WiFi is 802.11i
  - access control model is based on 802.1X
  - flexible authentication based on EAP and upper layer authentication protocols (e.g., TLS, GSM authentication)
  - improved key management
  - TKIP
    - uses RC4 → runs on old hardware
    - corrects WEP's flaws
    - mandatory in WPA, optional in RSN (WPA2)
  - AES-CCMP
    - uses AES in CCMP mode (CTR mode and CBC-MAC)
    - needs new hardware that supports AES

Chapter outline

Bluetooth

- Short-range communications between nearby devices
  - A mobile phone and a head set, a laptop and a mouse, or a computer and a printer, etc.
  - Only wireless stations
- Master-slave principle
  - One master, up to 7 slaves
- Eavesdropping is difficult:
  - Frequency hopping → to avoid interference with devices that operate in the same unlicensed ISM band
  - Communication is over a few meters only
- Security issues:
  - Authentication of the devices to each other
  - Confidential channel
- Both are based on secret link key

Bluetooth – initialization key setup

- When two devices communicate for the first time:
  - Set up the temporary initialization key.



Link Key Setup: Approach 1

- After setting up the initialization key
- When one of the devices, say device A, has memory limitations
  - A sends its long-term unit key encrypted with the newly established initialization key
  - A’s long-term unit key is used as the link key

Link Key Setup: Approach 2

- None of the devices has memory limitations
  - Both A and B generate random numbers and transfer them securely to each other with the initialization key
  - Both parties generate the link key based on exchanged random numbers and unique device addresses



Bluetooth - authentication

- The authentication protocol after the link key is established:



- If authentication fails, the verifier waits for some time before a new attempt can be made
  - The waiting time increases exponentially with every failed attempt

Bluetooth – encryption key generation

- Generation of the encryption key and the key stream with ACO:



Weaknesses

- The strength of the whole system is based on the strength of the PIN:
  - PIN: 4-digit number, easy to try all 10000 possible values.
  - PIN can be cracked off-line
    - Makes the mechanism of exponentially increasing waiting time ineffective
  - many devices use the default PIN.

- For memory-constrained devices: the link key = the long-term unit key of the device.

- Fixed and unique device addresses: privacy problem.

- Weaknesses in the E_0 stream cipher.