

A Functional Co-Design towards Safe and Secure Vehicle Platooning

Abstract—Cooperative adaptive cruise control (CACC) or platooning recently becomes promising as vehicles can learn of nearby vehicles’ intentions and dynamics through wireless vehicle to vehicle (V2V) communication and advanced on-board sensing technologies. Violation of cybersecurity often results in serious safety issues as been demonstrated in recent studies. However, safety and security in a vehicle platoon so far have been considered separately by different sets of experts. Consequently no existing solution solves both safety and security in a coherent way. In this paper, we show cyber attacks on an automated platoon system could have the most severe level of safety impact with large scale car crash and argue the importance of safety-security co-design for safety critical cyber physical systems (CPS). We propose a safety-security co-design engineering process to derive functional security requirements for a safe automated vehicle platoon system based on a deep comprehension on the interrelation of safety and security. To our best knowledge, we are the first to apply the safety-security co-design concept to a concrete application. Through this engineering process, we come up with a new platoon control algorithm that takes into account both safety and security. Our defense mechanism implicitly defends against safety-related cyber-attacks and greatly shortens the safe distance required when the platoon is not protected.

I. INTRODUCTION

Vehicle platooning has been studied as a method of increasing the capacity of roads since the 1960’s. In a vehicle platoon, a group of vehicles, following one another, acts as a single unit through coordinated movements. Because vehicles in a platoon travel together closely yet safely, this leads to a reduction in the amount of space used by the number of vehicles on a highway, thus has the great potential to *maximize highway throughput*. Cooperative adaptive cruise control (CACC) or automated vehicle platooning recently becomes promising as vehicles can learn of nearby vehicles’ intentions and dynamics through wireless vehicle to vehicle (V2V) communication and advanced on-board sensing technologies. Automation-capable vehicles in tightly spaced, computer-controlled platoons offer additional benefits such as *improved mileage and energy efficiency* due to reduced aerodynamic forces, as well as *increased passenger comfort* as the ride is much smoother with fewer changes in acceleration.

The complexity of an automated vehicle platoon system – including inter-vehicle communications, vehicle’s internal networking and its connection to external networks, as well as complicated and distributed platooning controllers – opens doors to malicious attacks. In-vehicle range sensors that are used to measure the preceding car’s speed and location might be altered. For instance, it was recently demonstrated that radar and LIDAR sensors can be spoofed with a modulated laser [2]. The wireless communication channel (DSRC) is vulnerable to manipulation and wireless messages can be spoofed by a motivated attacker [6], [9], [18]. All these attacks could

cause a wide array of problems in a deployed platoon, for example, an attacker could cause crashes, reduce fuel economy through inducing oscillations in spacing, prevent the platoon from reaching its (or each individual’s) destination(s), or cause the platoon to break up. The full potential of automated vehicle platooning will not be realized until the issues related to communication and application security can be satisfyingly resolved.

The violation of cybersecurity could result in serious safety violations such as car crashes. However, safety and security in a vehicle platoon have so far been considered separately by different sets of experts. On one hand, the safety discipline usually considers system failures (including systematic/random hardware and systematic software failures) or natural disasters as safety hazard resources. Safety solutions developed are usually not evaluated in an adversarial environment. On the other hand, the security discipline considers various attacks that can lead to different consequences such as loss of life, loss of privacy, financial loss, etc. The variety of security goals to address different types of attacks makes it very unlikely to be aligned with the goal of safety. Consequently security solutions proposed are rarely evaluated in terms of safety. For example, the model-based detection scheme [6], the only scheme proposed so far for platoon security, is designed from the **security point of view** by *monitoring any misbehavior of the preceding car*. Although the scheme is able to detect vehicle misbehavior, whether it can lead to a safe platoon is not answered. To date, no existing platooning solution solves both safety and security in a reconciled and coherent way.

Based on a joint functional safety and security analysis, we are able to reconcile different safety and security risks. For our purpose, we consider the subset of security threats that lead to safety consequences. This allows us to align our security goal with that of the safety. We propose a new platooning control algorithm that is designed from **the safety point of view**. Unlike the model-based detection scheme [6] which is designed from the security point of view where a vehicle treats the one before it as *potentially malicious*, in our scheme, a vehicle concentrates on self-safety, calculates *its own safety status* (instead of predicting other’s misbehavior) based on the context information and adjusts its next movement based on one criterion: whether it is safe to do so. If it senses the next step is not safe, the vehicle will switch from the cooperative driving CACC mode to the collision avoidance ACC mode. By centralizing on self-safety, our scheme achieves safety by implicitly defending against cyber attacks that could result in safety consequences.

Contributions: Our contributions are as follows:

- To fully understand the severity of cybersecurity-

induced safety risk, we introduce a leader crash attack to demonstrate the severity of such attack on the safety of vehicle platoon. To ensure the safety of platoons under attacks, We propose the concept of *safe distance* for platoons. A platoon has to travel with at least the safe distance to avoid any collision (Section III).

- Based on a deep comprehension of the potential security and safety risks, we put emphasis on safety-security co-design and make recommendations related to security and safety in automated vehicle platooning by integrating cybersecurity into safety design strategies. To our best knowledge, we are the first to apply the safety-security co-design concepts to a concrete application (Section IV).
- We propose a new platoon control algorithm emphasizing on self-safety. In our scheme, each vehicle cross-checks accelerations predicted by both the CACC and ACC controllers to determine whether the next move is safe. Our defense mechanism greatly shortens the safe distance required when the platoon is not protected (Section VI).
- Unlike previous works which only use simulations, we demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed scheme in achieving the safety goal as well as defending against cybersecurity attacks not just through vehicle network simulations but also through vigorous theoretical analysis (Section VII).

Organization: The organization of the paper is as follows. We overview related work in Section II. We present system and attack models as well as platooning controllers in Section III. We perform a joint safety and security risk analysis in Section IV where we also introduce a leader crash attack to analyze the severity of such attack on safety. We present two safe platooning schemes in Sections V and VI. Security analysis is presented in Section VII. Discussions and future work are presented in Section VIII and Section IX concludes the paper.

II. RELATED WORK

Vehicle and Vehicle Network Security. Vehicle security is an emerging topic. A number of previous works have demonstrated many insecure designs in modern vehicles [5], [10], [12], [14]. Vehicle network security has been extensively studied. Many techniques such as efficient message authentication, anonymous authentication to address various aspects of communication security and privacy have been proposed [11], [19]. Chenxi Zhang [19] presents an efficient batch signature verification scheme for communications between vehicles and roadside units. Xiaodong Lin [11] proposes an efficient social-tier-assisted packet forwarding protocol, for achieving receiver-location privacy preservation in Vehicular Ad hoc Networks.

Platooning Security.

The security of autonomous platooning has been recently studied. Mani Amoozadeh [9] presents a first look at the effects of security attacks on the communication channel as well as sensor tampering of a connected vehicle stream. The work of [6] introduces a set of insider attacks that can cause unexpected behavior in platoons. It suggests switching from CACC to ACC

if a crash could happen. Soodeh Dardras [18] presents that a single malicious controlled vehicle can destabilize a vehicular platoon.

Collision Avoidance. For collision avoidance, Gehrig and Stein [8] have proposed the concept of elastic bands and analyzed collision avoidance. Araki [4] presents a system which has automatic braking when the headway distance between the trailing vehicle and the selected vehicle crossed the safety threshold. Ferrara and Vecchio [7] propose a concept of a supervisor for the control system of every vehicle in the platoon to avoid collision.

III. MODELS AND SIMULATION ENVIRONMENT

In this section, we present the system model we use. We also provide information about the simulation platform we will use to carry out the work presented in this paper.

A. System Model

We consider a platoon of K cars numbered from 0 to $K-1$ with car 0 being the leader vehicle. We assume the platoon is already formed and do not consider platoon formation and dissolve (we leave platoon dynamics as our future work). All cars drive on a straight line with string stability. The order of cars does not change. We assume homogeneous cars which have the same physics, mechanics, and communication capabilities (this requirement will be relaxed in our future work). They are not immune to hardware/system failures, and cybersecurity attacks, so abnormal behaviors can happen.

1) *Communication and Mobility Models:* In order to study the safety and security of a CACC vehicle system, we utilize the PLEXE platform [16] for its built-in communication (IEEE 802.11p) and mobility models. PLEXE is an Open Source extension to the known and widely used Veins simulation framework [17] by adding platooning capabilities and controllers. Veins itself extends the OMNeT++ network simulator and the SUMO road traffic simulator. PLEXE implements a list of classic controllers for Cruise Control (CC), Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC), and Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control (CACC) to realize platooning capabilities.

2) *Cruise Control:* CC is a technology which allows a driver to select a desired speed and the car is driven automatically at the desired speed until CC is switched off by the driver. PLEXE implements the classic Cruise Control algorithm (Equation 1) which is already available on several commercial cars [13].

$$\ddot{x}_{des} = -k_p(\dot{x} - \dot{x}_{des}) - \eta \quad (1)$$

where \ddot{x}_{des} is the acceleration to be applied, \dot{x} is the current speed and \dot{x}_{des} is the desired speed, k_p is the gain of the proportional controller (set to 1 by default), while η is a random disturbance taking into account imprecision of the actuator and of the speed measure (default set to 0).

3) *Adaptive Cruise Control:* As CC only takes the desired and actual speed as inputs, the driver needs to manually switch off CC to avoid a collision when approaching a slower vehicle in the front. To avoid collision and also relieve the driver from this duty, high-end cars are now equipped with a radar or laser scanner to estimate distance to the preceding car. If a

slower car is detected, the system decelerates and automatically maintains a safe distance. This technology is known as ACC. ACC will automatically slow down the vehicle whenever it finds obstacles in the way.

The control law of ACC [13] used in PLEXE is defined as

$$\ddot{x}_{i_des} = -\frac{1}{T}(\dot{\epsilon}_i + \lambda\delta_i) \quad (2)$$

$$\delta_i = x_i - x_{i-1} + l_{i-1} + T\dot{x}_i \quad (3)$$

$$\dot{\epsilon}_i = \dot{x}_i - \dot{x}_{i-1} \quad (4)$$

where T is the time headway in seconds and $\dot{\epsilon}_i$ is the relative speed between two consecutive vehicles i and $i + 1$. δ_i is the distance error which is the difference between the actual distance $(x_i - x_{i-1} + l_{i-1})$ and the desired distance $T\dot{x}_i$. λ is a design parameter which is strictly greater than 0 and set to 0.1 by default.

4) *Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control*: The CACC controller implemented in PLEXE is a representative CACC controller based on classical control theory [13]. The status of each vehicle depends on the acceleration and speed of the leading and preceding vehicle in order to keep close vehicle following. It is capable of maintaining a fixed distance between cars no matter what the platoon's speed is.

The control law of the i -th vehicle in the platoon is defined as

$$\ddot{x}_{i_des} = \alpha_1\ddot{x}_{i-1} + \alpha_2\ddot{x}_0 + \alpha_3\dot{\epsilon}_i + \alpha_4(\dot{x}_i - \dot{x}_0) + \alpha_5\epsilon_i \quad (5)$$

$$\epsilon_i = x_i - x_{i-1} + l_{i-1} + gap_{des} \quad (6)$$

$$\dot{\epsilon}_i = \dot{x}_i - \dot{x}_{i-1} \quad (7)$$

\ddot{x}_{i_des} is the desired acceleration of i -th vehicle. \ddot{x}_{i-1} and \ddot{x}_0 are the acceleration of the preceding vehicle $i - 1$ and the leading vehicle. \dot{x}_i and \dot{x}_0 are the speed of i -th vehicle and leader vehicle. ϵ_i is the distance error based on a desired constant distance gap_{des} which is 5 meters by default. l_{i-1} is the length of car and the default value is 4 meters.

The α_i parameters in Equation 5 are defined as:

$$\alpha_1 = 1 - C_1; \quad \alpha_2 = C_1; \quad \alpha_5 = -\omega_n^2 \quad (8)$$

$$\alpha_3 = -(2\xi - C_1(\xi + \sqrt{\xi^2 - 1}))\omega_n \quad (9)$$

$$\alpha_4 = -C_1(\xi + \sqrt{\xi^2 - 1})\omega_n \quad (10)$$

C_1 is a weighting factor between the acceleration of the leader and the preceding vehicle, which is set to 0.5 by default. ξ is the damping ratio and set to 1 by default. ω_n is the controller bandwidth and set to 0.2 Hz by default.

B. Simulation Environment

We use PLEXE for all the (attack and defense) simulations carried out in this work. As mentioned earlier, PLEXE extends Veins which further extends the OMNeT++ network simulator and the SUMO mobility simulator. The coupling between the network and the mobility simulation framework is done through the TraCI interface which SUMO exposes. PLEXE extends the interaction through the TraCI interface in order to fetch vehicles' data from SUMO to be sent to other vehicles

in the platoon to realize CACC. Platooning protocols and the application logic are realized in the OMNeT++ framework.

To simulate the adversary, we need to provide the functionality that informs the adversary vehicle how to launch the attack. To achieve this, we need to refer to application layer logic. There is a BaseApp in PLEXE which simply extracts data out of packets coming from the protocol layer and updates CACC data via TraCI if such data is coming either from the leading vehicle or from the preceding vehicle. SimplePlatooningApp extends BaseApp and it tells the vehicle to use the controller requested by the user. We modify the SimplePlatooningApp so that to let vehicles follow the instructions of what we want them to do.

IV. SAFETY AND SECURITY CO-DESIGN

Safety has a long tradition in many engineering disciplines and has had successful standardization efforts. In automotive systems, the international standard ISO 26262 is the state of the art standard for safety critical system development. J3061 Cybersecurity Guidebook [15] is an overall guidebook on implementing cybersecurity for the entire vehicle. The safety-security co-design is being discussed in the secure software SAE committee at the moment and there is no final product yet. We are able to work with several key members of the SAE cybersecurity committee to understand the concepts and requirements as well as discuss the proposed safety-security engineering process.

A. Safety-Security co-Design

We propose a safety-security co-design engineering process which consists of four main steps: (1) Define the safety goal for the system; (2) Define attack model; (3) Derive security goals; (4) Derive functional security requirements.

Safety Goal. Safety is very important in automotive industry and therefore highly regulated. For end users, it means that users do not face any risk or danger coming from the motor vehicle or its spare parts. Unacceptable consequences for safety are loss of human life and injuries. The safety goal of individual vehicle is to protect users from injuries and life threatening risks. In our context, we set up the safety goal of vehicle platoon as avoiding car collisions that can cause human life and injuries.

Attack Model and Security Goal. Unlike safety, cybersecurity has a broader range of unacceptable consequences such as human life and injury (safety), human security, financial loss, loss of privacy, etc. Figure 1 shows the interrelation of safety and security. From Figure 1, we can see that safety can be an objective (or impact) of a security attack. It can also be an unintended consequence caused by hardware or software bugs. Meanwhile, cybersecurity attacks can have different impacts. The intersection part concerns both safety and security, or safety-related security risks, which is of interest of this paper.

To derive our attack model that lead to safety, we summarize various of attacks, targeting at automotive platoon systems, extensively studied by researchers in the literature and their corresponding possible consequences in Table I. From the table, we can see that there are five attacks which can lead to car collisions, result in safety issues, and thus belong to

Reference	Attack	Impact
[3]	Message falsification attack Message spoofing Message replay DoS (jamming) System tampering	Collision Collision Collision Dissolved platoon Collision
[6]	Collision induction attack Reduced headway attack Joining without radar Mis-report attack Non-attack abnormalities	Collision Decreased string stability Decreased string stability Decreased performance Decreased performance and string stability
[18]	Destabilization attack Platoon control taken attack	Decreased string stability Dissolved platoon

TABLE I: Attacks and impacts




Fig. 1: Interrelation of Safety and Security

the intersection in Figure 1. Our security goal is to develop a system that is resilient to these attacks.

Adversary Model: We consider insider attacks that can lead to safety issues such as car crashes in this work. Attacks that result in different consequences such as system performance, driver privacy, financial loss, etc. are not considered in this paper as they can be treated in the regular way without considering safety. The adversary or the vehicle controlled by the adversary is part of the platoon system and thus is able to send valid V2V messages. However, there is no guarantee on the correctness of information in the messages it sends. Also the adversary does not need to follow the control law. The adversary is able to control one or more vehicles, including the leader, in the platoon. However, it cannot control all the radars or radar signals of vehicles in the platoon because of the line-of-sight requirement.

Functional Security Requirements. From our analysis above, we can derive functional security requirements as follows:

- It shall not be able for an attacker to spoof a message;
- It shall not be possible to replay an old message;
- It shall not be possible for an attacker to broadcast a message with false information without being detected;
- The system shall be able to take a response action whenever such misbehavior is detected;
- The system shall ensure there is enough time for the system to respond.

B. Severity Analysis

The EU project EVITA provides a risk model to measure the security of in-vehicle systems [1]. In response to various safety risks, ISO 26262 severity classification defines four severity levels (S0, S1, S2 and S3) in terms of the estimated personal injury that could result from the risk. S0 refers to no injuries. S1 refers to light or moderate injuries. S2 means severe to life-threatening injuries (survival probable). S3 means life threatening (survival uncertain) or fatal injuries. The EVITA model extends the ISO 26262 safety classification by including a fifth level S4 which means fatal injuries of **multiple vehicles** as cyber security attacks may have more widespread implication than unintended hardware or software bugs can cause.

Previous work has shown that message falsification and collision induction attacks can result in serious safety issue. However, it is not clear the severity level of such attacks. To understand the severity level of a collision that is resulted from a cyber attack, we introduce a new attack called leader crash attack by extending the collision induction attack proposed in [6]. In the leader crash attack, the leading car stops suddenly (intentionally due to being remotely controlled by an attacker or not) and causes the following cars to crash over each other. This crash attack can be mounted by any insider, not just the leader, in the platoon. However it is very likely a crash attack induced by the leader can have the most severe consequence.

We use the PLEXE simulator to demonstrate the consequence of this attack (**severity**). In this simulation, initially a platoon of four vehicles is driving at the speed of 100 km/h with a gap of 5 meters (we will use the same platoon as a concrete example throughout the rest of the paper). At the time of 50s, we instruct the leader vehicle to stop. We set the deceleration of the leader car extremely large so that the speed can decelerate to zero in a very short time interval. In this way, the leader vehicle acts just like it suddenly hits the brake or crashes into something like a wall so that it stops immediately. We see how the following vehicles will respond under the CACC controller strategy. To obtain an insight of speed changing of the platoon in the crash, we utilize the statistics collected from PLEXE which are shown in Figure 2. In Figure 2, Vehicle 0 with the red line is the leader vehicle. Vehicle 0 decelerates from 100 km/h (27.77 m/s) to 0 km/h in a very short time interval. The following vehicles are trying to prevent crash by decelerating, but the 5-meter gap is not long enough for them to fully stop before they crash into the car before it. The above three lines terminating at different

time spot shows that each of them has crashed into the leader vehicle.




Fig. 2: Speed Changes of Platoon during the Crash

More on severity. The above simulation clearly demonstrates that the leader car crash attack can potentially result in multiple car damage and life injuries and has the highest level of safety severity. However, the maximum safety impact of security attack demonstrated is only a **local** event to several vehicles. We believe the worst security impact can potentially be *nation-wide* impacting thousands or millions of cars and suggest a new severity level of **S5: nation-wide wide spread and harmful impact**. For example, in the platoon context, suppose there is a security weakness that has an impact due to forged DSRC messages, also suppose future smart-phones are DSRC enabled and malware spread on smartphones, we can easily see a nation-wide attack platform to attack the platoon mechanism. Due to the severity of security attacks on platoon systems, we strongly argue the importance of designing safe and secure platoon systems.

V. SAFE PLATOONING: FIRST ATTEMPT

The platoon in SARTRE Project is driving at 90 km/h with a 4-meter gap between vehicle. Meanwhile, Energy ITS maintains a 80 km/h platoon with 4-meter gap. Our example platoon used in this paper is traveling at 100km/h with a 5-meter gap. From the previous simulation on leader crash attack, we can see that when the leader vehicle in the platoon crashes suddenly, such a short distance between cars is not enough for the following vehicles to decelerate. To avoid collision, without changing the underlying CACC controller, the straightforward idea is to simply increase the distance between cars so that a car can stop before it crashes over the proceeding car.

We use PLEXE to test this naive idea to find the required safe distance. In the SimplePlatooningApp, we set the constant space to a specific value at first by using the TraCI interface to update the CACC data. We increase the constant gap between vehicles step by step until we find that when the car-to-car distance is increased to 67 meters, the following vehicles will not crash into preceding vehicles. 67 meters equal to a headway of $T = 2.4s$ when the vehicle is traveling at 100km/h. Figure 3 shows speed changing of vehicles when the gap is increased to 67 meters. We can see the leader vehicle stops at 50.38s and the following vehicles stops at 56.16s, 58.42s and 60.9s.




Fig. 3: Naive Solution: Speed Changing

A. Theoretical Analysis of CACC Safe Distance

In order to prove that we find the correct safe distance for a platoon under the leader crash attack, we calculate the theoretical safe distance value by using MATLAB and do a cross check with our simulation result. In the CACC controller, the acceleration of each vehicle is calculated based on the leader vehicle and preceding vehicle. Vehicle 0 is leader vehicle and we study the performance of vehicle 1. If vehicle 1 does not crash into vehicle 0, the following two vehicles will not crash either as there is longer distance for them to decelerate.

In Equation (5), we set \ddot{x}_0 and \dot{x}_0 to 0 and other variables to their default values. x refers to location of the vehicle. \dot{x} and \ddot{x} refers to the speed and acceleration of the vehicle. In this way, we transfer Equation (5) to Equation (11).

$$\ddot{x}_1 = -0.4\dot{x}_1 - 0.04(x_1 - x_0 + l_0 + gap_{des}) \quad (11)$$

Obviously, Equation (11) is a second order differential equation and x_0, l_0, gap_{des} are constant values. x_0 is the location where the leader vehicle crashes. l_0 is the length of vehicle 0 and gap_{des} is the distance between two vehicles. By solving this equation, we acquire the relation between vehicle location x and time t . By differentiating the equation between vehicle location x and time t , we can obtain the relation of a vehicle speed \dot{x} and the time t . With the time t when the vehicle speed decreases to 0, we are able to obtain the location x where the vehicle stops. If location x is smaller than the location of the leader vehicle x_0 , we say there is enough safe distance for the platoon.

Algorithm 1 is the MATLAB program which is used to estimate the theoretical safe distance a platoon needs to maintain to defend against a leader crash attack. From the statistics collected by OMNeT++, we can get the final position of leader vehicle x_0 which is 1424 meters. The speed of Vehicle 1 $Dx(0)$ in initial state is 27.77 m/s (100 km/h). The default length of vehicle l_0 is 4 meters. Taking the vehicle length into consideration, we hope that the final position of Vehicle 1 which is the output of the algorithm should be 1420 meters. By adjusting the input gap_{des} and the original location of Vehicle 1 $x(0)$, we need to achieve $gap_{des} + x(0) = x_0 - l_0$. Therefore, the gap_{des} is the exact safe distance for the platoon to decelerate during a leader crash attack. After executing the algorithm, we find out that when the gap_{des} equals 51 meters

Algorithm 1 Safe Distance Calculation

- 1: **Input:** Vehicle Location location, Vehicle Speed speed
 - 2: **Output:** Final Position of the Vehicle
 - 3:
 - 4: Use *dsolve* method to find the relation between location x and time t . Original state is $x(0) = \text{location}$, $Dx(0) = \text{speed}$
 - 5: $x = \text{dsolve}(D2x + 0.4Dx + 0.04x - 0.04(x_0 - l_0 - \text{gap}), t)$
 - 6:
 - 7: Use *diff* method to find the relation between speed and time
 - 8: $\text{speed} = \text{diff}(x)$
 - 9:
 - 10: Find the time when Vehicle 1 decelerates to 0
 - 11: $\text{speedChar} = \text{char}(\text{speed})$
 - 12: $\text{time} = \text{solve}(\text{speedChar}, t')$
 - 13:
 - 14: Find the position where Vehicle 1 finally stops
 - 15: $f = \text{inline}(x)$
 - 16: $\text{answer} = f(\text{time})$
-

and the position of Vehicle 1 $x(0)$ equals 1369 meters where it starts to decelerate, then it will stop at the distance of 1420 meters. In this way, the safe distance is the difference between two positions which is 51 meters.

The safe distance in theoretical analysis is a little bit smaller than that in the simulation. There are several reasons leading to this consequence. The first one is that CACC controller strategy in simulation is discrete where the mobility update time interval is 0.01 second and message broadcasting time interval is 0.1 second. The second reason is that to simplify the problem, we assume that x_0 in Equation (11) is a constant value which actually is changing during leader vehicle's crash but within a very short time. Last but not the least, in PLEXE, the desired acceleration computed by the controller cannot be applied immediately, as there will be actuation lags connected to driveline dynamics. In the simulator, the acceleration at simulation step n is computed based on the desired acceleration (computed by the controller) and the acceleration in the previous simulation step.

From the discussion above, we can see that CACC does not help in achieving better safety under urgent situations. Although increasing vehicle distance can help to achieve safety, this naive solution kills the space efficiency a platoon brings as a headway of $T = 2.4s$ is enough for a human driver to stop safely from a speed of 100km/h.

VI. PROACTIVE SAFE PLATOONING

As shown in previous section, the naive approach to safe platooning does not work as it totally removes the space efficiency which is the major reason why vehicle platoon is designed for. This motivates us to design a secure and safe CACC algorithm which achieves safety and security without losing space efficiency.

To improve collision avoidance of the CACC function, our idea is to include ACC in the design of the CACC function as ACC is designed for collision avoidance. It relies on range sensors like radar or laser scanner to estimate the distance

to the preceding car. Real time distance information can be further used to estimate the preceding car's velocity and acceleration. We utilize ACC acceleration as the baseline for safe situation determination. In normal situations, the acceleration rate calculated by CACC is less than the acceleration rate calculated by ACC (i.e., speed change in CACC is usually more smoothly than that in ACC for improved user comfort). Let Δ denote the fluctuation range of ACC acceleration. When the acceleration rate of a vehicle falls into this range $[ACC - \Delta, ACC + \Delta]$ (here, ACC refers to acceleration in ACC controller strategy), it indicates there is no immediate crash threat. On the contrary, if the acceleration of a vehicle is out of the range, it indicates abnormal situation and we need to switch to ACC to avoid collision.

From Equation (5) and Equation (2), the accelerations of CACC and ACC in normal state can be calculated. By setting parameters to their default values, we are able to get Equation (12) and Equation (13).

$$\begin{aligned} \ddot{x}_{i_cacc} = & 0.5\ddot{x}_{i-1} + 0.5\ddot{x}_0 - 0.4\dot{x}_i + 0.3\dot{x}_{i-1} + 0.1\dot{x}_0 - 0.04x_i \\ & + 0.04x_{i-1} - 0.04l_{i-1} - 0.04\text{gap}_{des} \end{aligned} \quad (12)$$

$$\ddot{x}_{i_acc} = -\frac{1}{T}(\dot{x}_i - \dot{x}_{i-1} + 0.1x_i - 0.1x_{i-1} + 0.1l_{i-1} + 0.1T\dot{x}_i) \quad (13)$$

Let us define

$$\Delta = \max(|\ddot{x}_{i_cacc} - \ddot{x}_{i_acc}|) \quad (14)$$

In normal situation, the platoon is driving with a fixed speed and constant gap between cars. Therefore, we can assume that \ddot{x}_{i-1} and \ddot{x}_0 are 0 with \dot{x}_i , \dot{x}_{i-1} and \dot{x}_0 are equal. Meanwhile we have $\dot{x}_{i-1} - \dot{x}_i = \text{gap}_{des} + l_{i-1}$ so that the acceleration of CACC \ddot{x}_{i_cacc} is 0. For ACC, T is headway and then we have $\ddot{x}_{i_acc} = -\frac{1}{T}(0.1T\dot{x}_i - 0.1\text{gap}_{des})$. Finally, the guideline for range is achieved with $\Delta = \max(|\frac{1}{T}(0.1T\dot{x}_i - 0.1\text{gap}_{des})|) = 0.1\max(\dot{x}_i) - \frac{0.1\text{gap}_{des}}{T}$. $\max(\dot{x}_i)$ is the max speed of Vehicle i . This max speed is not the maximum mechanical speed a car can have. Instead, it is the max speed set by automatic driving. Usually the max speed in automatic driving is less than the actual max speed a car can have because passenger comfort is usually an important factor in automatic driving.

Based on the above analysis, we propose Proactive CACC Algorithm. In our algorithm, a vehicle calculates desired acceleration in both CACC and ACC controller strategy. It switches to ACC if the defense mechanism ($|\ddot{x}_{i_cacc} - \ddot{x}_{i_acc}| > \Delta$) is triggered.

To demonstrate whether the proposed algorithm works, we conduct a simulation with the example platoon under leader crash attack. When we set the range value to 2, the platoon is safe with a safe distance of 13 meters.

We modify the PLEXE to make sure that platoon can switch between CACC and ACC whenever it needs. MSCF-Model_CC is a vehicle driving model which implements the CACC, ACC and other control strategies, like Cruise Control (CC) and human driving mode. Within the *v()* method in MSCFModel_CC, it computes the desired acceleration of each type of controller strategy and then choose the requested one. When it comes to CACC controller strategy, we use CACC proactive algorithm to calculate the desired acceleration. If the difference between CACC and ACC acceleration is within the

range Δ , we return CACC acceleration, otherwise we return ACC acceleration. In the experiment, we find out that when we set the range to 2 m/s^2 , we can achieve string stability and safety both. At the same time, we also achieve a much shorter safe distance which is 13 meters. The reason why the following vehicles start accelerating after they stop is that in default setting, all vehicles should park close to each other.




Fig. 4: Speed Changes of Platoon Running Proactive CACC Algorithm

In the experiment, in order to show string stability, we make the speed of the platoon oscillate with a frequency of 0.2 Hz and the average speed is 100 km/h (27.77 m/s). From Figure 4, we can see that all the vehicles maintain the same velocity during the oscillation. Meanwhile, the acceleration of platoon computed by CACC also oscillates but within a minimal range. For simplicity, we regard \ddot{x}_{i_cacc} as 0. The highest speed \dot{x}_i is 29.16 m/s and the gap in this experiment is 13 meters. Therefore, we obtain $\Delta = 1.42$ which is close to our simulation result. So our algorithm achieves safety and efficiency. In the next section, we prove its security under the two insider attacks.

VII. SECURITY ANALYSIS

In this section, we analyze the security of the proposed proactive safe CACC algorithm in terms of resilience to the collision induction attack and message falsification attack which may lead to car collisions. We want to show that such an attack will cause a big difference between CACC and ACC acceleration values and thus trigger the vehicle to switch from CACC to ACC in order to avoid collision. For each attack type, we will provide a theoretical analysis on its resistance first and then demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed scheme through simulation by using a concrete platoon example.

A. Security Resistance to Collision Induction Attack

1) *Theoretical Analysis*: Assume initially the platoon is already formed and traveling at a fixed velocity with a fixed gap gap_{des} between cars. In this situation, the acceleration of platoon is $\ddot{x}_{cacc} = 0$. Every vehicle broadcasts its current speed (\dot{x}) and acceleration (\ddot{x}_{cacc}) to its following car. Suppose Vehicle $i - 1$ is the attacker and it begins to mount collision induction attack at certain time. It decelerates at a fixed deceleration rate and at the same time it sends false state information (speed and acceleration) to Vehicle i . We consider

two cases of false state information. In Case 1, the attacker tells the following car that it is traveling the same as before with the same velocity and acceleration rate of 0 while it is actually decelerating. In Case 2, the attacker tells the follower that it is speeding up with a non-zero positive acceleration rate. In the following, we will show that the attack in both cases will trigger our defense mechanism. The following car, Vehicle i , is able to switch from CACC to ACC.

Assuming the platoon is already driving at a fixed speed with a fixed gap, as shown in Section VI, we have $\Delta = \max(|\frac{1}{T}(0.1T\dot{x}_i - 0.1gap_{des})|) = 0.1\dot{x}_i - \frac{0.1gap_{des}}{T}$.

Considering Case 1 first. In Case 1, the attacker $i - 1$ pretends it is driving at the same parameters as before. As inputs to Vehicle i 's CACC algorithm remain the same, i.e., $\ddot{x}_{i_cacc} = 0$ in our assumed setting. Vehicle i calculates its ACC rate by using Equation (13):

$$\begin{aligned} \ddot{x}_{i_acc} &= -\frac{1}{T}(\dot{x}_i - \dot{x}_{i-1} + 0.1x_i - 0.1x_{i-1} + 0.1l_{i-1} + 0.1T\dot{x}_i) \\ &= -\frac{1}{T}(\dot{x}_i - \dot{x}_{i-1}) - \frac{0.1(x_i - x_{i-1} + l_{i-1})}{T} - 0.1\dot{x}_i \\ &= -\frac{1}{T}(\dot{x}_i - \dot{x}_{i-1}) + \frac{0.1gap'}{T} - 0.1\dot{x}_i \end{aligned} \quad (15)$$

Hence we have:

$$|\ddot{x}_{i_cacc} - \ddot{x}_{i_acc}| = \frac{1}{T}(\dot{x}_i - \dot{x}_{i-1}) - \frac{0.1gap'}{T} + 0.1\dot{x}_i \quad (16)$$

When Vehicle $i - 1$ starts to mount collision induction attack, it broadcasts message to Vehicle i while decelerating. After a message broadcasting time interval, Vehicle i receives the message and begins to adjust its movement. During that time interval, because the attacker Vehicle $i - 1$ decelerates and the gap decreases, therefore, we have $\dot{x}_i > \dot{x}_{i-1}$ and $gap' < gap_{des}$ where gap' is the latest measured gap which Vehicle i measures using a radar sensor. It is obvious the difference between \ddot{x}_{i_cacc} and \ddot{x}_{i_acc} is larger than Δ , which will trigger the defense mechanism and Vehicle i will follow the instructions of ACC in the next step.

The above analysis can be easily extended to analyze Case 2. As Vehicle i will receive a message from the attacker to speed up, so we have $\ddot{x}_{i_cacc} > 0$. \ddot{x}_{i_acc} is calculated the same as in Equation (15): \ddot{x}_{i_acc} is negative and its absolute value is larger than $THRESHOLD$. Therefore, the absolute difference between CACC and ACC acceleration is larger than $THRESHOLD$. This will trigger our defense mechanism and Vehicle i will follow ACC in the next step. .

2) *Defense Simulation*: We conduct experiments to show that the proposed Proactive CACC Algorithm can defend against Collision Induction Attack. In the experiment, Vehicle 1 starts to send false messages to Vehicle 2 at 50.0 second. Instead of sending its real velocity to Vehicle 2, Vehicle 1 chooses to broadcast a velocity value that is twice of its real speed so that Vehicle 2 will follow the message to speed up. Meanwhile, Vehicle 1 decelerates from 100 km/h (27.77 m/s) to 80 km/h (22.22 m/s) at a deceleration of 9 m/s^2 . In order to show Proactive CACC Algorithm can help platoon maintain string stability, we make the platoon velocity oscillates at a frequency of 0.2 Hz with an average speed of 100 km/h (27.77 m/s). When the attacker decreases its speed from 100km/h

to 80km/h (in contrast to the leader crash attack where the attacker decreases its speed from 100km/h to 0), our defense mechanism can prevent collision from happening even when the platoon is with a 5-meter gap. The simulation is completed by modifying MSCFModel_CC and SimplePlatooningApp. In MSCFModel_CC, we pass false messages from Vehicle 1 to Vehicle 2 and in SimplePlatooningApp we instruct Vehicle 1 to decelerate. The range is set to 3.9 m/s^2 to achieve string stability.




Fig. 5: Collision Induction Attack Defense

We run two simulations. The first simulation is to show the vulnerability of the platoon under the collision induction attack when there is no defense mechanism enforced. The second simulation is to show how effective of the proposed Proactive CACC Algorithm in defending against the attack. Due to space limitation, we are only able to provide result of the second simulation. Speed changes of vehicles in the second simulation are plotted in Figure 5. From the figure, we can see following vehicles 2 and 3 can successfully avoid collisions even when the platoon is under the mis-report attack. They switch to ACC immediately after the attacker decelerates and detach themselves from the platoon. Eventually Vehicles 1, 2, and 3 reach to ACC stability by following the attacker's speed.

B. Security Resilience to Message Falsification Attack

Message falsification attack [3] or mis-report attack as known in [6] is an attack where a vehicle broadcasts a message with false information. It could be done by an insider attacker who does not trust the CACC controller strategy. When the platoon is driving on the highway with a minimal gap, the larger the gap between current car and following car is, the safer the driver will feel. Under this circumstance, the driver may send a false message to the following vehicle to tell it to keep a smaller velocity compared with the actual platoon speed so that the gap will be enlarged. Unlike collision induction attack, the attacker still moves according to the CACC controller strategy.

Assume initially the platoon is already formed and traveling at a fixed speed with a fixed gap. Suppose Vehicle $i - 1$ is the attacker and it wants to mount mis-report attack. It maintains the speed while broadcasting false message to Vehicle i to tell it to slow down. The attacker defines a **mis-report percentage** $\alpha \in [0, 1]$ and then send the false speed $\alpha \dot{x}_{i-1}$ to Vehicle i . The

mis-report percentage α determines the level of cheating on its speed. Apparently the smaller α is, the more the attacker cheats on its speed. In the following, we will show that depending on the cheating value of α , mis-report attacks with small α values (high cheating levels) will trigger our defense mechanism while mis-report attacks with large α values (low cheating levels) will only decrease platoon performance.

Since we assume the platoon is driving at a fixed speed in initial stage, we can assume that all the vehicles' speed are the same ($\dot{x}_i = \dot{x}_{i-1} = \dot{x}_0$) initially. After a simulation time step, Vehicle i receives a false message from the attacker Vehicle $i - 1$. It calculates the accelerations by using both CACC and ACC. From Equation (12) and Equation (13), we can get

$$\begin{aligned} \ddot{x}_{i_cacc} &= -0.3\dot{x}_i + 0.3\alpha\dot{x}_{i-1} - 0.04(x_i - x_{i-1}) \\ &\quad - 0.04(l_{i-1} + gap_{des}) \\ &= -0.3\dot{x}_i(1 - \alpha) - 0.04(gap_{des} - gap') \end{aligned} \quad (17)$$

$$\begin{aligned} \ddot{x}_{i_acc} &= -\frac{1}{T}(\dot{x}_i - \dot{x}_{i-1} + 0.1x_i - 0.1x_{i-1} + 0.1l_{i-1} + 0.1T\dot{x}_i) \\ &= -\frac{1}{T}(\dot{x}_i - \dot{x}_{i-1}) - \frac{0.1(x_i - x_{i-1} + l_{i-1})}{T} - 0.1\dot{x}_i \\ &= -0.1\dot{x}_i + \frac{0.1gap'}{T} \end{aligned} \quad (18)$$

So we have

$$\begin{aligned} \ddot{x}_{i_cacc} - \ddot{x}_{i_acc} &= -0.2\dot{x}_i + 0.3\alpha\dot{x}_{i-1} - 0.04(gap_{des} - gap') \\ &\quad - \frac{0.1gap'}{T} \end{aligned} \quad (19)$$

Equation (19) is linear function of α , so there exists a value α_1 such that when $\alpha = \alpha_1$, the left side of the equation becomes $\ddot{x}_{i_cacc} - \ddot{x}_{i_acc} = 0$ or $\ddot{x}_{i_cacc} = \ddot{x}_{i_acc}$. When $\alpha > \alpha_1$, it is easy to prove that $|\ddot{x}_{i_cacc} - \ddot{x}_{i_acc}| < \Delta$, and it will not trigger the defense mechanism. Now we consider the opposite situation when $\alpha < \alpha_1$. We have

$$\begin{aligned} |\ddot{x}_{i_cacc} - \ddot{x}_{i_acc}| - \Delta &= 0.1\dot{x}_i - 0.3\alpha\dot{x}_{i-1} \\ &\quad + 0.04(gap_{des} - gap') + \frac{0.1gap' + 0.1gap_{des}}{T} \end{aligned} \quad (20)$$

Similarly there exists a value α_2 such that when $\alpha = \alpha_2$, the left of the equation $|\ddot{x}_{i_cacc} - \ddot{x}_{i_acc}| - \Delta = 0$ or $|\ddot{x}_{i_cacc} - \ddot{x}_{i_acc}| = \Delta$. In this way, it is easy to see that when $\alpha < \alpha_2$, we have $|\ddot{x}_{i_cacc} - \ddot{x}_{i_acc}| > \Delta$ and it will trigger the defense mechanism.

In summary, whether a mis-report attack can trigger the defense mechanism depends on the level it wants to cheat on its speed. When $\alpha < \alpha_2$, a mis-report attack will trigger our defense mechanism. When $\alpha > \alpha_2$, which means a less severe mis-report attack, the attack only breaks the string stability of the platoon, leads to platoon oscillation, and thus decreased platoon performance.

1) *Defense Simulation:* Same as in the defense simulation on collision induction attacks, we run two simulations to show how a platoon will respond with and without applying our defense mechanism and we only present simulation result of the platoon which is equipped with our Proactive CACC Algorithm. In the simulation, the attacker Vehicle 1 does not send its real velocity. It broadcast a false speed that is half of its true speed. That is $\alpha = 0.5$.




Fig. 6: Mis-report Attack Defense

Simulation result is shown in Figure 6. From Figure 6, we can see the following vehicles 2 and 3 oscillate after receiving the false message. They switch between CACC and ACC to ensure safety. In this way, we sacrifice string stability to avoid severe accidents.

VIII. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE WORK

Our analysis, simulation, and evaluation are performed over PLEXE. The controllers (CACC, ACC, and CC) used in PLEXE are classical and representative. Although we believe our approach is general enough to extend to other controllers, still we think it is necessary to evaluate the proposed solution over other realizations of platoon systems using different controllers. We are currently communicating with the Crash Avoidance Metrics Partnership (CAMP) for potential collaboration on its platoon implementation.

In our study, we assume a homogeneous platoon system. In reality, apparently, a platoon consists of heterogeneous vehicle systems. Experiences, lessons and recommendations gained from this study may not apply to a heterogeneous platoon system. Heterogeneous platooning has been studied by the transportation research community. We are going to extend our work by considering heterogeneous vehicle platoon systems.

Our study is based on theoretical analysis and simulation. In reality, the situation can be more complicated. We believe our work provides some insights on the safety and security of platooning and hope it can open a new area of research towards safer and more secure platoon mechanisms.

IX. CONCLUSIONS

In this paper, we present our work towards a safe and secure platoon co-design. We have shown that cyber attack on a platoon system can have the most severe and widespread safety impact as defined by the EVITA vehicle security risk model. We argue the importance of safety-security co-design for safety critical cyber physical systems and make the first effort toward a safety-security co-design engineering process which allows functional security requirements to be derived for a safe automated vehicle platoon system. We propose a new platoon control algorithm that takes into account both safety and security. The effectiveness of the proposed scheme in achieving the safety goal as well as defending against security attacks

has been analyzed, demonstrated, and evaluated through both theoretical analysis and vehicle network simulation.

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